We analyze the impact of a freeway interchange collapse in the San Francisco Bay area on the difference in airfare quotes for travel into the area's main airports. The incident temporarily made Oakland airport a less attractive choice for traveling to San Francisco, so we hypothesize that fares for travel into Oakland will be relatively lower while the freeway interchange was out of service. We test our contention using a sample of fare quotes collected online, and find the expected effect of a magnitude of 6-7 percent. Our results imply the following important conclusions. First, the demand-side shock was absorbed by the supply side. Second, adjustment of prices and return to the status quo once the shock vanished was swift.
Introduction
It is a well-established fact that economists' ability to conduct controlled experiments is limited. However, unexpected events which change economic agents' incentives do happen, and these events may allow researchers to gain some insights on how firms and consumers behave in the naturally occurring world versus how fundamental economic theories suggest they should behave. People traveling to the city of San Francisco would temporarily find Oakland a less attractive airport to fly into/from, due to increased expected travel time (and higher expected variance thereof) between the airport and the city, due to the increased congestion on a major freeway leading to the airport. Such a change in substitutability should be reflected in lower than normally expected demand for flights from/into OAK as compared to the area's other airports. Since the airlines tend to adhere to their published schedules and are unlikely to respond to this demand shock by temporarily cutting their capacity 1 , our expectation is that the fares for flying into OAK should be lower while the freeway interchange was out than after the reconstruction has been completed. Alternatively, airlines could keep the prices fixed at the pre-collapse level and decrease the yield (i.e., sell fewer full fare seats for trips 1 According to T-100 dataset of the US Department of Transportation, total capacity (in terms of number of seats offered by the commercial airlines in connection with their scheduled services within the United States) increased across all three area airports from April to May 2007 (by 2.5 percent at Oakland, 7.5 percent in San Francisco, and 4.2 percent in San Jose). From May 2007 to June 2007, the capacities at all three airports remained flat. As we will discuss later, such capacity adjustments will only reinforce our story.
to OAK). In simple economic terms, the first strategy amounts to adjusting prices while the second strategy leads to absorbing the shock with quantity adjustment.
The collapse of the interchange provides us with a clearly exogenous shock with known timing. Notably, we know that the shock evidently affected the demand side of the market and it had little effect on the supply, so that we have a clear identification of the short-run supply curve. We therefore get a rare opportunity at studying how the demand-side shock has been absorbed by the supply side.
In addition to providing us with a 'quasi natural experiment' setting, the incident gives us a rare opportunity of analyzing the impact of a 'surface transportation infrastructure disaster'. In addition to counting the extra time spent in traffic jams or estimating the number of trips not taken due to the incident, we demonstrate that the impact of a road infrastructure disruption spreads beyond roads to the related industries which rely on roads. Our study thus underscores the importance of the surface road infrastructure for communities and the economy.
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we collected (via a major travel agent and some of the individual airlines' web sites) price quotes for travel to each of the three major airports in the San Francisco Bay Area from eleven large U.S.
metropolitan areas (combined, these areas are home to more than a quarter of the U.S. population). Focusing on the last minute fare quotes, we conducted our data collection exercise weekly, starting ten days after the freeway interchange collapse, and finishing at least six weeks after the planned completion of rebuilding the interchange.
2 Data analysis revealed that the effect of the freeway interchange collapse was to widen the gap between the fares for travel into OAK versus other two area's airports by approximately 6-7 percent so that travel into OAK was relatively cheaper than into other airports. We also suggest that the demand shock has been fully (or at least to a substantial degree) absorbed by the supply side of the market (airlines), as the size of the fare reduction effect is not inconsistent with the value of additional travel time for a likely passenger due to congestion that the freeway interchange collapse might have produced en route from the city of San Francisco to OAK airport (see background information section below for details). While we are unable to accurately assess how fast the downward adjustment was following the shock, the 'return to status quo' after the shock ended was almost immediate. Hence, we find no price stickiness in airfares.
In addition to studying absorption of the demand shock by the supply side of the market; our natural experiment can be related to several broad issues in the economic literature. First, this study can be related to the literature on product differentiation. Specifically, we examine the impact of an event which effectively lowered substitutability between the area's airports by decreasing the perceived 'quality' of one of them. Second, the paper contributes to the literature examining the effects of road congestion. Yet, unlike other studies on this issue, which look at the 'longer-term' impact of road congestion outside roads 3 , our paper analyzes an immediate impact of a change in road congestion conditions. Forbes' (2008) study on the link between increased congestion at New York's LaGuardia airport and the airfares is closely related to our work (yet, that study examined the connection between the airport congestion and airfares). Third, we investigate the degree of price stickiness in the airline industry and thus provide evidence on the sensitivity of prices to an exogenous demand shock. Our results complement previous literature documenting the duration of prices across goods by effectively constructing dynamic responses of prices to an exogenous shock and thus providing a qualitatively new type of evidence on price stickiness.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides background information on Bay Area airports and the accident. Section 3 discusses the data collection process. Section 4 describes the data analysis methodology and results. Section 5 concludes.
Background

Bay Area Airports
Commercial At each of the airports we can identify an airline which can be considered a dominant carrier. Specifically, the market share of United Airlines at SFO is currently about 43 percent (in terms of the number of passengers carried); Southwest
Airlines is the dominant airline in both OAK (63 percent of passengers) and SJC (over 40 percent market share). All numbers relate to passenger traffic on the U.S. domestic routes.
To give the reader a better idea of the airports' location relative to the cities they are named after (which also happen to be the area's major cities), the following It is evident from Figure 1 that the freeway interchange collapse occurred away from the major roads leading to the airports. We cannot however say that this event did not have any potential to affect the motorists driving to Oakland
International Airport from San Francisco. Indeed, traffic which previously went straight from eastbound 80 to eastbound 580 (from San Francisco inland, including to downtown Oakland, after crossing the Bay Bridge), now had to make a detour using southbound 880, thereby adding to the San Francisco to Oakland airport traffic.
Given that interstate 880 is part of the truck transportation corridor -meaning a good number of heavy-duty vehicles on the road at any time -additional traffic may mean congestion on the previously not congested road.
To give the reader an idea of the volume of traffic involved, consider the following numbers. According to the California Department of Transportation data, peak time traffic on freeway 580 East of the interchange with freeways 80 and 880 amounts to 17,800 vehicles an hour; whereas just before the interchange to North 80 (after cars going to/from San Francisco and freeway 880 left 580) the road only handles 7,000 vehicles an hour at peak time. In the 'worst case scenario' this would mean that over 10,000 vehicles could be returning at an afternoon peak hour from San Francisco using the collapsed interchange. If they all were to enter 880 going towards OAK airport, we would observe 10,000 more vehicles per hour on a road handling around 13,000 vehicles in a peak hour already -nearly double the usual traffic.
This 'worst-case scenario' is a dramatization. Yet, we can reasonably suggest that while the eastbound 80 to eastbound 580 interchange was out, we might (at a normal peak hour) observe several thousand more vehicles sharing southbound 880
with OAK airport traffic. Given the average peak-hour traffic volume on that stretch of 880 (around 13,000 vehicles per hour, both directions), even 2,000 vehicles returning from San Francisco would amount to about 15 percent increase in peak-hour traffic; moreover, assuming 880 traffic is split equally between northbound and southbound (this would be 6,500 vehicles per peak hour in either direction), our hypothetical but not unreasonable 2,000 extra vehicles will amount to about 30 percent increase in OAK Airport bound traffic from San Francisco during peak hours.
On four-lane 5 stretches of 880, the increase in traffic we discussed above would mean that the number of vehicles per peak hour per lane would increase to 2,125 from 1,625. According to the Highway Capacity Manual, a highway becomes congested once traffic volume reaches 2,000-2,200 vehicles per hour per lane. Therefore, our hypothetical but quite a probable scenario implies that the freeway interchange collapse could have contributed to creating congestion where it was not present before. Thus, to a certain extent Oakland could have become a less attractive option relative to SFO at the time the freeway interchange was out.
Substitutability between airports
The evidence that Oakland International is indeed considered an alternative to San
Francisco International by the travelers whose final destination is across the Bay 5 The 880 freeway has 4-5 lanes in each direction. According to that survey, we can say the following:
• Business travelers are more likely to use SJC and OAK than SFO, the SJC-SFO difference being larger than the OAK-SFO difference;
• o Furthermore, a quarter of all surveyed passengers started their trips in the city of San Francisco.
• Travelers originating their trips in the city of San Francisco are very unlikely to fly out of SJC;
• There is some substitutability between SJC and SFO for residents of San Mateo county (the one located between San Francisco and San Jose); otherwise, SJC is the most 'local' airport of the three, with three quarters of its passengers originating their trips in either San Mateo or Santa Clara (the one which includes the city of San Jose) counties.
In general, while passengers do tend to prefer airports closest to their home or place of business, the preferences are not entirely lexicographic, and substitution takes place Finally, while public transportation (including airport access by same) in the San Francisco Bay Area is more developed than in, for example, the Greater Los Angeles Area, the above-mentioned survey of air travelers clearly states that around 80 percent of travelers surveyed got to OAK airport by a personal vehicle (whether private or rented); the same number for SFO was about 68 percent. While this percentage could have been lower during the event we study, we have little reason to believe it dropped substantially below the numbers reported above.
Data
The majority of the data used for this study was collected via Orbitz (www.orbitz.com) -one of the big three on-line travel agents on the US air ticket distribution market. 7 Since this particular travel agent did not at the time offer fare quotes by the two important low cost carriers serving the San Francisco Bay area airports (Southwest and JetBlue), we had to collect fares offered by those carriers from their web-sites. While JetBlue did at the time sell its tickets via another leading on-line travel agent (Travelocity), we chose to go to the carrier's web-site instead, as some travel industry experts indicated to us that it was not clear at the time whether one would necessarily find the carrier's best deals with that travel agent.
The data collection exercise was centered on the notion of a last minute traveler on a short trip, willing to choose between the metropolitan area's airports in search of a deal. This strategy has two advantages. First, we can work under an assumption that our hypothetical customer knows she will travel, and therefore does not care whether the ticket is refundable or not. 8 Second, differences in fare quotes across the airlines closer to the departure date are likely to reflect differences in realization of demand for the carriers' services, as the companies known to practice yield management set fares based on the number of empty seats on flights.
9
The fare quotes were collected every Tuesday (for departure on Wednesday and return on Friday of the same week). We obtained the data on sixteen different dates starting from the week of May 08 to August 21, 2007. Since we collected the data once a week, we will use the terms like "day of data collection" and "week of data collection" interchangeably throughout the paper. On each day of data collection, we gathered fare quotes for travel to each of the three San Francisco Bay area airports from eleven large metropolitan areas (combined, these are home to about a quarter of US population). Thus, on each date of data collection, we made three queries on Orbitz for travel to each of the San Francisco area airports; in addition to that, we collected fare quotes on Southwest Airlines' and JetBlue Airways' web-sites. Some of the origin areas are served by multiple airports -in which case we searched across all the area's airports. The following metropolitan areas have been included into our analysis:
9 One can legitimately claim that even though we suppose our hypothetical customer's travel uncertainty has been realized; he may at the same time still prefer some flexibility, especially with respect to being able to change the time of the return flight (in which case the assumption that our traveler does not care about whether the ticket is refundable or not seems not to be valid). However, once the passenger has embarked upon the roundtrip journey, he will have to come back, whether on the flight he originally had his reservation on or on a different one. Then, conditional on the customer traveling, the difference between the refundable and the non-refundable ticket is similar to that between a lottery and a certain outcome (see also Escobari and Jindapon, 2009). Also note that once (and even before) the trip has begun, a customer on a non-refundable ticket can change his travel plans for a fee. In summary, travelers with refundable and non-refundable tickets should feel similar effects from the freeway collapse.
• Boston, Massachusetts -served by Boston Logan International Airport (BOS).
Southwest Airlines markets nearby Providence, Rhode Island, and Manchester, New Hampshire airports as alternatives to flying directly into Boston Logan.
These are however not such a close substitutes to BOS 10 ; therefore, no Southwest
Airlines' fare quotes for travel from Providence and Manchester were collected.
• Chicago, Illinois -served by O'Hare (ORD) and Midway (MDW) airports;
Southwest Airlines' services are from MDW; when searching on Orbitz, we used airport code CHI, which searched both airports.
• Denver, Colorado -served by Denver International (DEN).
• • Miami, Florida -includes Miami International (MIA) and Ft. Lauderdale (FLL) airports.
• LGA.
• Phoenix -Scottsdale, Arizona -served by Phoenix Sky Harbor International (PHX).
• Seattle -Tacoma, Washington -served by Seattle International Airport (SEA).
• Las Vegas, Nevada -served by Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS).
• Houston, Texas -includes Houston Hobby (HOU) and George Bush (the father)
Intercontinental (IAH) airports. Southwest provides its services out of HOU.
• claim that business travelers may prefer non-stop flights for the last-minute trips of short duration; we cannot exclude the possibility of travelers exhibiting loyalty to the airlines not offering non-stop services on the given route (or on the given days), as well as the chance that non-stop flights might be far from the customer's most preferred departure time.
While Bilotkach and Pejcinovska (2007) estimate that fare quotes for one-stop trips are higher for shorter flights; we nevertheless recorded those even for the shorter-haul markets in our sample, for the sake of consistency. 13 We ended up with 3,828 unique fare quotes. Analysis of the data we collected is presented in the next section.
Analysis
Data Description
We start our analysis by examining a different data source to see whether the freeway interchange collapse had any discernable impact on demand for air travel on the routes included into our analysis. Specifically, a dataset known as T-100 Segment collected monthly by the US Department of Transportation provides data on the number of passengers carried by the US airlines on all non-stop flights. We used this 12 While we in the process of the data collection exercise have not clicked through to see whether the quoted fares were indeed available; there is good evidence (e.g., Bilotkach and Pejcinovska, 2009) that major on-line travel agents do not engage in the 'bait-and-switch' practices (whereby the fare increases by the time one gets to the point of purchasing the ticket) on the US domestic market. 13 When performing the data analysis, we did estimate our specifications without one-stop fare quotes for short-haul routes. We will discuss this issue further in this paper.
dataset to calculate the non-stop traffic to the three San Francisco area airports from all the metropolitan areas included into our analysis in May and June of 2007 (that is, while the freeway interchange was out and after it was rebuilt). The corresponding market shares and differences are presented in the following table.
As we can see from Table 2 , between May and June of 2007 market share of
Oakland airport fell only for three out of eleven metropolitan areas included in our analysis; furthermore, most of the substitution appears to happen between OAK and SFO. Thus, we can say (although superficially) that the event has indeed affected demand for travel to/from the Bay area in the direction we predicted.
[ Table 2 here]
Now, let us take a look at our sample of fare quotes. Table 3 describes the distribution of our sample by the origin metropolitan area. Table A .2 in the Appendix gives the same information by market -a more detailed breakdown. Note that our sample includes quotes for both non-stop and one-stop travel, and the latter can and do end up being rather high -the numbers in the tables below suggest we have outliers more or less evenly spread out across the markets. For the entire sample, the 99 th percentile fare quote is about $1,550; and the 95 th percentile is close to $1,300.
[ Table 3 here] Although we can discern no obvious pattern of dynamics of fare quotes in our sample, this is hardly surprising given how many factors influence airfares. In the next section, we carefully examine the effects of the interchange collapse on airfares after controlling for a number of observable characteristics.
Hypothesis and Methodology
Our empirical strategy is based on the difference-in-differences approach. The null hypothesis of our analysis is that fares for travel into OAK airport were on average the same before and after completion of reconstruction work on the collapsed freeway interchange. In the regression context, we employ the following specification: In our regressions we controlled for the following effects, using appropriate dummy variables: Airline; Origin metropolitan area; Date of collection; Airlineorigin metropolitan area; Airline -destination airport. Additionally, we included a dummy variable for fare quotes for one-stop itineraries, as well as the interaction of this dummy with the non-stop flight distance between the origin and the destination airports (including distance by itself did not make sense as this effect is captured by the origin metropolitan area dummies). Finally, we used a dummy variable for price quotes for code-share itineraries (that is, flights for which the operating carrier was different from the one selling the ticket); flights performed by the commuter airlines for major carriers were classified as those performed by the major carriers. Since least squares regression is sensitive to outliers, we drop the top 1 percent of fare quotes.
14 While early completion of the repair work was doubtlessly good news for the area commuters; it also left us with only three collection days' worth of data on fare quotes before actual project completion date. We do have another 4-5 (depending on where you put June 27, which is both the planned project completion date and a Wednesday or a departure date in our data collection exercise) days worth of data on fare quotes before the planned repair completion date. This actually allows examining how fast fares adjusted following the disappearance of the demand shock. Table 4 and Figure 3 present main findings of our analysis. In Table 4 , we report results for the entire sample and for the sub-sample excluding the data collected in August (our original research design was reasonably symmetric around the date of planned project completion; excluding August makes our data more symmetric around the actual project completion date). All specifications in Table 4 include both the Airline-Origin Metropolitan Area and the Airline-Destination Airport effects; we varied the "before completion" time period artificially to include the first three, six and nine weeks of data collection. Note that the actual project completion date (May 24) falls in week 3; while the target date initially announced by the governor of California is June 27, which falls in week 8 of our data collection exercise. The natural logarithm of the fare quote, net of taxes and fees, was used as a dependent variable in all regressions.
Results
[ Table 4 here] 14 Estimates for both the entire sample and the sample without top 5 percent of quotes are similar to those reported below. Table 4 demonstrates presence of the effect we conjectured. In particular, the Oakland-other airports fare difference before the actual project completion is about 6 percent lower than that after the project has been completed. The effect appears to diminish in size gradually after the actual project completion date, vanishing by the initial target project completion date; we will provide a more formal test for this observation later on.
Reported coefficients on control variables are consistent with our predictions.
Specifically, fares for travel to Oakland airport are lower than to other area gateways, confirming the reputation of OAK as the choice airport of the so-called low cost carriers; fares in the first weeks of data collection are also lower than in subsequent ones, predominantly due to the fact that demand for air travel in late spring and early summer happens to be lower than in July and August -traditional peak travel months. to nine first weeks of our data collection exercise, as well as including different combination of airline and market level controls (panels (c) correspond to 15 We have mentioned above that not all the one-stop fare quotes included into our sample represent itineraries that would be likely purchased by actual travelers. We therefore have redone our exercise, discarding the one-stop fare quotes from the airports for which one-stop flights would be an impractical alternative (Phoenix, Las Vegas, Seattle, and Denver). All the results reported in the paper have held (including the robustness checks and the quick dissipation result).
specifications reported in Table 4 ). This figure basically confirms the results reported in Table 4 and shows that as we expand the period of treatment (limited availability of the freeway) the fare differential declines to the point where it is not statistically different from zero.
[ Figure 3 here]
Results reported thus far allow us to state that the freeway interchange collapse had the expected impact on "OAK-other airports" airfare differential, which clearly lasted up to the date of actual reopening of the collapsed bridge segment. Also, the price differential seems to have persisted for some time up to the projected completion date.
However, this latter result could be an artifact of aggregating weeks before and after completion which could mask sharp adjustment of price after the freeway re-opening.
To remove this aggregation effect, we separated the time period before actual project completion (weeks 1 through 3 of data collection) from that after the actual completion date of May 24 until the target date of June 27 (weeks 4 through 8) and reestimated our baseline specification. Results presented in Table 5 show that the fare differential was in line with our hypothesized effect during the construction period and then quickly dissipated after reopening of the collapsed freeway interchange.
Price adjustment was thus complete and instantaneous. This result holds whether or not we exclude the fare quotes collected in August from consideration.
This important robustness check shows that the price adjustment to precollapse levels occurred at the time when the interchange became actually operational (3 weeks after the collapse) rather than when the interchange was scheduled to be reopen (8 to 9 weeks after the collapse). Hence the quickness of the price response cannot be explained by the airlines planning to adjust prices on a particular date and instead it was determined by the actual opening of the interchange. In other words, price adjustment was state dependent rather than time dependent.
[ Table 5 here]
In another robustness check, we repeated our data analysis exercise for data collected after June 12. Specifically, we dropped all observations collected during weeks 1 through 6, and split the remaining data into artificial "before-after" intervals, with the "before" interval consisting of three (weeks 7 through 9), six (weeks 7 through 12), and nine (weeks 7 through 15) consecutive dates of data collection. Results of this placebo test (Table 6 ) suggest that the effect is indeed zero when it is not supposed to exist.
[ Table 6 here]
The final issue we need to consider is that of changes in airlines' capacities. Indeed, a sharp increase in capacity at OAK relative to SFO after the freeway interchange collapse would lead to lower prices at that airport. In general, any exit at SFO and entry at OAK while the freeway interchange remains out would lead us to detect the effect where it does not exist; whereas any entry at SFO and exit at OAK over the same time period would reinforce our conclusion, should we detect the effect we supposed existed. We employed several strategies to control for the possible bias due to airlines' entry in and exit from certain routes during the time covered by our data collection.
First, we controlled for monthly (as available in the T-100 data) frequency of non-stop flights on a given route. Second, we discarded the airline-route combinations for which we observe significant (defined as adding or removing at least one daily nonstop flight) changes in capacity over the time period covered by our data collection exercise. None of these modifications changed our results in any important way.
In summary, our estimates suggest that while the freeway interchange was out of service fare quotes for travel into OAK airport were on average 6-7 percent lower than same for travel into SFO or SJC gateways. We also find that the price differential dissipated quickly and completely after reopening of the freeway. 16 It was clear from the T-100 dataset that entry occurred on May 31, 2007. In July 2007, Southwest increased its presence on this route to 4-5 daily flights.
Discussion
At the basic level, it appears that the exogenous shock which led to the change in substitutability between the two airports did affect the corresponding price differential. To assess the plausibility of our results, let us compare the estimated effect to the value of time for a traveler likely to purchase a last minute ticket.
Specifically, suppose the freeway interchange collapse did create congestion on the way from San Francisco to Oakland International in such a way that the drive time increased from 32 to 60 minutes, or by almost half an hour (see Table 1 which is approximately 7 percent of the average fare into OAK airport in our sample.
Thus, the effect we measured is both sizeable and (roughly speaking, of course) not inconsistent with the value of extra travel time for a "probable" last minute traveler.
To the extent we can construe our estimate as that of the value of travel time, our estimate of $40 would be probably on the upper end of the distribution of such estimates found in the literature (see Small and Verhoef, 2004; Brownstone and Small, 2005) . However, we can easily reconcile our estimate with previous findings by noting that our potential customer is quite likely to earn above average wages.
Our finding that prices almost instantaneously revert to pre-collapse levels provides new evidence on the sensitivity of airfares to shocks. Previous work showed that the airfares are among the least sticky prices. For example, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) document that the median duration of airfares is about one month while the median duration of price spells across all goods is between 9 and 11 months.
We complement this literature by presenting impulse responses of airfares to an exogenous demand shock and showing that airfares exhibit quick adjustment and practically no inertia. The price dynamics is probably best described as an example of state-dependent pricing.
Based on the above information, we can claim that the supply side of the market is likely to have 'fully' absorbed the demand shock (of course, we do not take into account consumer heterogeneity and other factors, so our above thought experiment is only suggestive). We can unfortunately identify our effect only up to the difference between OAK and other airports' fares. Since airlines are known to practice yield management, we can suggest the following mechanisms that could have yielded the result we observed. On the one hand, as demand temporarily switched away from OAK (see Table 2 ), we could have picked up more discounted fares for travel into this airport. On the other hand, the airlines could have simply raised their high fares for travel into other gateways, keeping OAK fares the same. We cannot conclusively rule out any of these alternatives.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the sensitivity of prices to demand shocks in a natural experiment This event, which amounted to both an exogenous demand-side shock for the airlines operating at the area's airports and a significant surface transport infrastructure disruption, temporarily made OAK airport a less attractive choice as compared to SFO for travelers to San Francisco. The purpose of our analysis was to determine how fast and how fully the shock has been absorbed by the supply side, as well as to study the effect of the shock after the shock that caused it disappeared. In addition, our paper examines how a surface road infrastructure disruption affected an industry which crucially depends on this infrastructure. Knowing the exact timing and nature of the shock provides a clean causal interpretation of results in this analysis.
We collected a sample of fare quotes for travel to the three San Francisco Bay area airports via both a leading on-line travel agent and web sites of two major airline companies whose fare quotes were not adequately represented by on-line travel agencies. Importantly, this sample of offered fares is the set of alternatives a hypothetical consumer sees when he or she actually buys a ticket. Our focus was on the last minute fare quotes, as these better reflect actual realization of demand for travel to the area airports. We chose eleven large metropolitan areas (combined, these are home to more than a quarter of U.S. population) for our data collection exercise.
The data analysis revealed that the OAK-other airports fare differential was 6-7 percent lower before reopening of the collapsed freeway interchange as compared to same after the reconstruction work has been completed. The monetary value of this estimate appears consistent with the value of extra travel time a hypothetical business traveler would incur due to additional road congestion following the incident. Thus, we argue that the demand shock was absorbed by the supply side to a substantial degree. Once the demand side shock disappeared, price adjustment to status quo was swift demonstrating that the airfares have practically no price stickiness.
We can draw several general conclusions from our results. First, the market's reaction to the change in substitutability was both swift and in the expected direction; moreover, return to 'normalcy' appeared to be fast as well. Second, it turns out that changes in road congestion can have an almost immediate effect on the markets affected by it. Third, prices appear to be flexible to the extent that airfares adjust within a week in response to shocks.
Our study took advantage of a rather unique event, which both was unanticipated and led to a rather clearly defined temporary change in substitutability between the available alternatives. The results could have been different with less competition on the supply side or in other geographical areas; we have however demonstrated the ability of the supply side to quickly react to, and absorb demand side shocks in a setting that resembles a controlled experiment of the type not commonly encountered in social sciences. Tables   Table 1 Distances and driving 1. Reported numbers are shares (in percent) of passengers traveling non-stop from a given metropolitan area to a given airport in San Francisco area.
2. Calculations performed based on information contained in the T100 dataset.
3. Shares/differences are subject to rounding.
4. See the previous section for a definition of metropolitan areas/airports included. 1. This figure graphs coefficients and 95-percent confidence intervals of the estimate on OAK×BeforeCompletion interaction variable, varying 'before completion' time period artificially from two to nine first weeks of data collection. 2. All specifications control for variables reported in Table 4 and: a. Neither airline-origin nor airline-destination effects b. Only airline-destination effects c. Both airline-origin and airline-destination effects 3. Coefficients on control variables are stable across specifications. Table 6 Regression results excluding first six weeks of data collection 
